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chology must lay stress upon the localization of sense impressions, and at the same time it must investigate the relations of the associational spheres to consciousness. In commenting upon the criticisms which have been passed on his contention that brain localization aids psychology, the author merely says that we must not begin with the wrong sort of question; that the facts speak for themselves; that he is convinced of the importance for psychology of the minute study of the brain with reference to the dependence of mental processes upon its functional activity; and that only further investigation of the subject is worth while.

The remainder of the article is concerned with the examination of our knowledge of certain motor and sensory defects which have been studied to advantage by brain physiologists, with the facts of ontogenic development in their bearing upon the subject in hand, and, finally, with the significance of studies of the phylogenetic series. In all of these facts the author finds something of value for psychology.

By way of general comment upon the article, it may be added that no one can deny that brain physiology is of more or less value to psychology if this subject be not defined as the science of the subjective fact. For those who contend that psychology is a purely introspective science, brain physiology can no more have value in advancing our knowledge of mental life than can the study of lower animals. Flechsig's article emphasizes certain of the important facts, physiological and psychological, which have been discovered by the researches of the brain physiologists, and indicates how they have influenced the study of psychic processes and modified psychological theories.

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Stages of the Discussion of Evolutionary Ethics. T. DE LAGUNA. *Philosophical Review,* September, 1905. Pp. 576-589.

The discussions of the bearing of the theory of evolution upon ethics have passed through several fairly distinct phases. First, there was the problem of the validity of morality in view of an evolutionary theory of the world, but it was soon realized that moral experience remains what it is whatever view we may take of the relation of man to the lower creatures; evolution may be read as a leveling up as well as a leveling down. Next, there arose the question of whether the principle of the struggle for existence could be assumed as the principle of moral development. Against such a purely selfish reading of the social struggle as might be represented by a Nietzsche it was maintained either that (*a*) the biological struggle was not a purely selfish one or that (*b*) morality arises in opposition to this natural law of the lower life and does not profess to follow its principle. The third phase of the discussion is complex and difficult to characterize briefly. It is represented by Spencer, Stephen, and perhaps Alexander, who attempt to express moral experience in biological terms, maintaining that rational action brings with it no new functions or ends, but is valuable only as effecting a better adjustment to the older biological ends. The intelligent agent recognizes the value of social cooperation, but only as a means to life. Accidentally connected with the thought of this group are the ideas of hedonism, of the transitory nature of the sense of obligation, of a completely evolved society and of the equivalence of good to more developed action.

The fourth phase concerns the value of social inheritance as a factor in the higher stages of evolution. With the recognition of this comes the relegation of the study of organic evolution to a very secondary place in ethics and the placing of a much higher importance upon the direct study of social and individual development, especially upon the latter. The specific character of moral development as the direct outcome of individual moral struggle thus receives adequate recognition. Finally, the problem now under discussion is the place and value of the genetic method in ethics. On the one hand is the claim that development throws no light on the moral question, since both good and evil are evolved and success is no test of value; on the other is the reply that the persistence of a moral sentiment in society must be considered as indicating its relation to social welfare and that the present can not be understood apart from its history. "The truth is that evolutionary ethics, as a peculiar variety or school, has almost ceased to exist. What has emerged from the half-century-long discussion is a method of research that is used, with more or less freedom, by almost every recent ethical writer of importance."

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Ueber die Funktionen der Stäbchen und Zapfen und über die physiologische Bedeutung des Sehpurpurs. H. PIPER. *Medizinische Klinik,* Nos. 25–26, 1905. Pp. 19.

This is an admirable and concise summary of the experimental evidence for von Kries's theory of the function of the retinal rods and cones, the so-called *Duplizitätstheorie.* While the apparent fact that even the periphery of the retina responds with color sensation to sufficiently intense color stimuli may constitute a genuine difficulty for this theory, it must not be forgotten that the researches of Piper himself on dark-adaptation, quite aside from the experimental evidence offered by von Kries, seem to confirm the view, beyond any possibility of contradiction, that the retinal rods afford sensations of white light and the cones primarily of colored light. Piper finds ground for believing (p. 14) that even the *cones* of the extreme periphery are incapable of giving color sensations. The recent work of Trendelenburg has also confirmed the duplicity theory by showing that the spectral absorption-curve for visual purple that has been extracted from the retina is practically identical with the curve of gray values given by the spectrum to the dark-adapted eye.

If there should be any unfavorable criticism to make of this summary it would be that Piper perhaps minimizes the importance of the recent work of Nagel and Schaefer, which seems to show that the fovea itself is capable of a certain amount of dark-adaptation, which is more than a